I know it's not politically correct to acknowledge but the root cause is antisemitism. Indeed, Robert L. Bernstein, founder of Human Rights Watch, says that antisemitism is "deeply ingrained and institutionalized" in "Arab nations in modern times." I hope the following persuades you of this fact.
The Kingdom of Jordan has been ruled by Hashemites since World War I, when (in 1918) the Hashemite Army (with the support of local tribes) defeated the Ottoman Turks. After World War I, under the British Mandate for Palestine, the Hashemites continued the rule of Transjordan. In 1922, Transjordan was recognized as a state, under the British Mandate for Palestine, but remained under British supervision until after World War II (1946) when the U.N. recognized it as a sovereign state.
(Trans)Jordan's largest ethnic group throughout this period (and long before) was — and still is — Palestinians. What this means is that, since the 1917 Balfour Declaration, when the Zionist movement for a Jewish Homeland in Israel got British recognition, the main concern centered on when, where, and how the proposed state of Israel would be carved out of the British Mandate for Palestine and what would happen to the affected Palestinians.
Before I continue, think about the previous paragraph for just a second . . . WHY the need to partition these two groups? Why not just let both groups coexist in one country? As is often the case with such partitioning, the reason is incompatibility. Antisemitism has always plagued Jews and, in the case of (Arab) Islamic countries, that antisemitism has, historically, been institutionalized, by Sharia, in the form of dhimma laws. Jews have traditionally been, by law, inferior to Muslims. Western pressure, over the last century-and-a-half, has diminished these laws but not the traditional, Quranic, attitudes at the heart of the incompatibilities between Arab Muslims and Jews.
At this point, I should point out that hundreds of countries have been established via partitioning. Currently, there are 13 countries (NOT including Palestine) that have been established, in the last century or so, by partitioning an existing country. With that in mind, Palestine sticks out like a sore thumb for its 75-year refusal — by both its citizens and governments — to build its own future. This is because their antisemitism is visceral: taught to their children at home and in schools. Ever since Israel’s statehood began, Palestinians have voted ONLY terrorist groups into power: the PLO, then Fatah, then Hamas. The cauldron of violence is kept boiling by Palestine’s mandate for violence against Israel (and the retaliations from Israel) and by the callous refusal of Arab nations to allow citizenship for Palestinians. For its own security, Israel must take extreme measures to protect itself. Given the barbarity of the current (October 2023) Palestinian assault on Israel, I will not blame Israel for ANY measure they deem necessary for their own survival.
Anyway, back to specifics. One obvious option was to make Transjordan (representing 80% of the British Mandate) the Palestinian homeland: after all, it was already, ethnically, Palestinian. But the Palestinians vehemently refused because that would leave 20% of the mandate available for Israel. The problem wasn't really the size of the proposed Jewish homeland — it was the existence of any Jewish homeland at all. With the uncompromising legacy of dhimma, it’s not so much about getting 100% . . . it’s about the Jews getting 0%.
Eventually, the Palestinians got Transjordan anyway but many of them stayed put in what was left of the British Mandatory Palestine. We all know the rest. The remaining 20% of territory was divided between local Palestinians and Jews . . . and all hell broke loose.
Israel didn't hold out for a larger slice of the territory. They accepted the tiny 10% of the territory. This excerpt is from the 1948 Arab–Israeli War wiki:
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Israel’s military and espionage services are considered among the world’s best, but on Saturday, operational and intelligence failures led to the worst breach of Israeli defenses in half a century.
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A bulldozer breaking through a fence.
Hamas fighters used earth-moving equipment to breach the border fence between Gaza and Israel on Saturday, allowing more than 1,500 fighters to surge through nearly 30 points along the border.Credit...Mohammed Fayq Abu Mostafa/Reuters
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By Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley
The reporters spoke to current and former Israeli security officials to build an understanding of how Israel failed to foresee and confront the Hamas attack.
Published Oct. 10, 2023
Updated Oct. 11, 2023, 12:43 a.m. ET
Shortly before attackers from Gaza poured into Israel at dawn on Saturday, Israeli intelligence detected a surge in activity on some of the Gazan militant networks it monitors. Realizing something unusual was happening, they sent an alert to the Israeli soldiers guarding the Gazan border, according to two senior Israeli security officials.
But the warning wasn’t acted upon, either because the soldiers didn’t get it or the soldiers didn’t read it.
Shortly afterward, Hamas, the group that controls Gaza, sent drones to disable some of the Israeli military’s cellular communications stations and surveillance towers along the border, preventing the duty officers from monitoring the area remotely with video cameras. The drones also destroyed remote-controlled machine guns that Israel had installed on its border fortifications, removing a key means of combating a ground attack.
Fighting in Israel and Gaza, in Photos
Oct. 7, 2023
That made it easier for Hamas assailants to approach and blow up parts of the border fence and bulldoze it in several places with surprising ease, allowing thousands of Palestinians to walk through the gaps.
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These operational failures and weaknesses were among a wide array of logistical and intelligence lapses by the Israeli security services that paved the way for the Gazan incursion into southern Israel, according to four senior Israeli security officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to discuss a sensitive matter and their early assessment of what went wrong.
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Men with rifles, some dressed in combat gear and wearing black balaclavas, fill the back of a moving pickup.
Palestinian attackers moved toward the border fence with Israel on Saturday from Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip.Credit...Said Khatib/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
The brazen infiltration of more than 20 Israeli towns and army bases in that raid was the worst breach of Israel’s defenses in 50 years and shattered the nation’s sense of security. For hours, the strongest military in the Middle East was rendered powerless to fight back against a far weaker enemy, leaving villages defenseless for most of the day against squads of attackers who killed more than 1,000 Israelis, including soldiers in their underwear; abducted at least 150 people; overran at least four military camps; and spread out across more than 30 square miles of Israeli territory.
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The four officials said the success of the attack, based on their early assessment, was rooted in a slew of security failures by Israel’s intelligence community and military, including:
Failure by intelligence officers to monitor key communication channels used by Palestinian attackers;
Overreliance on border surveillance equipment that was easily shut down by attackers, allowing them to raid military bases and slay soldiers in their beds;
Clustering of commanders in a single border base that was overrun in the opening phase of the incursion, preventing communication with the rest of the armed forces;
And a willingness to accept at face value assertions by Gazan military leaders, made on private channels that the Palestinians knew were being monitored by Israel, that they were not preparing for battle.
“We spend billions and billions on gathering intelligence on Hamas,” said Yoel Guzansky, a former senior official at Israel’s National Security Council. “Then, in a second,” he added, “everything collapsed like dominoes.”
The first failure took root months before the attack, as Israeli security chiefs made incorrect assumptions about the extent of the threat that Hamas posed to Israel from Gaza.
Hamas stayed out of two fights in the past year, allowing Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a smaller armed group in Gaza, to take on Israel alone. Last month, Hamas leadership also ended a period of rioting along the border, in an agreement brokered by Qatar, giving the impression that they were not looking for an escalation.
“Hamas is very, very restrained and understands the implications of further defiance,” said Tzachi Hanegbi, Israel’s national security adviser, in a radio interview six days before the assault.
When Israeli intelligence officials briefed senior security chiefs last week about the most urgent threats to the country’s defenses, they focused on the dangers posed by Lebanese militants along Israel’s northern border.
The challenge posed by Hamas was barely mentioned.
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Israeli soldiers, dressed in their uniforms and wearing medical masks, carrying a stretcher with a covered body.
Israeli soldiers carrying the body of a person who was killed in the village of Kfar Azza, Israel, on Saturday.Credit...Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times
Hamas is deterred, the briefers said, according to one of the security officials.
In calls, Hamas operatives, who talked to each other when tapped by Israeli intelligence agents, also gave the sense that they sought to avoid another war with Israel so soon after a damaging two-week conflict in May 2021, according to two of the Israeli officials. Israeli intelligence, they said, is now looking into whether those calls were real or staged.
The next failure was operational.
Two of the officials said that the Israeli border surveillance system was almost entirely reliant on cameras, sensors and machine guns that are operated remotely.
Israeli commanders had grown overly confident in the system’s impregnability. They thought that the combination of remote surveillance and arms, barriers above ground and a subterranean wall to block Hamas from digging tunnels into Israel made mass infiltration unlikely, reducing the need for significant numbers of soldiers to be physically stationed along border line itself.
With the system in place, the military started reducing the number of troops there, moving them to other areas of concern, including the West Bank, according to Israel Ziv, a retired major general who commanded ground forces in the south for many years, served as the head of the I.D.F.’s Operations Division from 2003 to 2005, and was recently recruited into the reserves again because of the war.
“The thinning of the forces seemed reasonable because of the construction of the fence and the aura they created around it, as if it were invincible, that nothing would be able to pass it,” he said.
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Palestinians climb on a smoking Israeli tank beside the border fence with the Gaza.
Palestinians with a destroyed Israeli tank next to the border fence on Saturday.Credit...Mohammed Fayq Abu Mostafa/Reuters
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But the remote-control system had a vulnerability: It could also be destroyed remotely.
Hamas took advantage of that weakness by sending aerial drones to attack the cellular towers that transmitted signals to and from the surveillance system, according to the officials and also drone footage circulated by Hamas on Saturday and analyzed by The New York Times.
Without cellular signals, the system was useless. Soldiers stationed in control rooms behind the front lines did not receive alarms that the fence separating Gaza and Israel had been breached, and could not watch video showing them where the Hamas attackers were bulldozing the barricades. In addition, the barrier turned out to be easier to break through than Israeli officials had expected.
That allowed more than 1,500 Gazan fighters to surge through nearly 30 points along the border, some of them in hang-gliders that flew over the top of the barricades, and reach at least four Israeli military bases without being intercepted.
Photos shared by one of the Israeli officials showed that scores of Israeli soldiers were then shot as they slept in their dorms. Some were still wearing their underclothes.
The second operational failure was the clustering of leaders from the army’s Gaza division in a single location along the border. Once the base was overrun, most of the senior officers were killed, injured or taken hostage, according to two of the Israeli officials.
That situation, combined with the communication problems caused by the drone strikes, prevented a coordinated response. This kept anyone along the border from grasping the full breadth of the assault, including the commanders who rushed from elsewhere in Israel to launch a counterattack.
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A line of people heading a gap broken through the border fence, with smoke rising in the distance.
Palestinians on Saturday passing through a break in the border fence between Gaza and Israel.Credit...Yasser Qudih/Reuters
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“Understanding what the picture was of the different terrorist attacks was very difficult,” said Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfuss, an Israeli commander who helped lead the counterattack.
At one point on the ground, the general encountered — by chance — a commander from another brigade. There and then, the two men decided on an ad hoc basis which villages their respective units would try to retake.
“We decided just between ourselves,” the general said. “And that’s how we went by, from one village to another.”
All of this meant it was hard, especially in the early stages, to communicate the gravity of the situation to the military high command in Tel Aviv.
As a result, no one there sensed the immediate need for a massive, rapid air cover, even as social media emerged with reports of attacks in many communities. It took hours for the Air Force to arrive over much of the area, even though it has bases just minutes away in flying time, according to two of the Israeli officials and survivors of the attacks.
The fallout has been catastrophic for Israel’s security, as well as potentially damaging to its reputation in the region as a reliable military partner.
Before Saturday, “Israel was an asset to many countries in the region on security issues,” Mr. Guzansky said. “The image now is that Israel is not an asset.”
The Israeli security services do not dispute the scale of their initial failure. But they say that it can only be investigated after the war ends.
“We’ll finish this,” said Lt. Col. Richard Hecht, a military spokesman, as the army attempted to regain control of the communities on Saturday.
But, he said, “You know that this will be investigated.”
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A landscape photo with a broken fence in the foreground and smoke billowing from a town in the background.
The breached security fence in the village of Kfar Azza, which was attacked by Hamas on Saturday.Credit...Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times
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Ronen Bergman reported from Tel Aviv, and Patrick Kingsley from Jerusalem.
Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House. More about Ronen Bergman
Patrick Kingsley is the Jerusalem bureau chief, covering Israel and the occupied territories. He has reported from more than 40 countries, written two books and previously covered migration and the Middle East for The Guardian. More about Patrick Kingsley
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Report by a senior staff member in El-Al:
Yesterday arrived at JFK airport in New York, a Haredi passenger with a half a million dollars credit card, stood in the corner,
Anyone who showed him Order 8 - he bought him the ticket.
The man paid for 250 flight tickets and asked to remain anonymous.
The picture was taken from there with sacks of donations to the army, vests, clothes, lanterns, equipment for soldiers.
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Lawrence Summers, the former president of Harvard University, said he was “sickened” by the institution’s lack of response after some student groups blamed Israel for Hamas’ attack, which has killed more than 900 Israelis, most of them civilians.
“The silence from Harvard’s leadership, so far, coupled with a vocal and widely reported student groups’ statement blaming Israel solely, has allowed Harvard to appear at best neutral towards acts of terror against the Jewish state of Israel,” Summers said on X, formerly known as Twitter.
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Facing intense blowback over how Harvard has responded to the weekend’s violence in Israel and Gaza, the university’s president, Claudine Gay, on Tuesday condemned “the terrorist atrocities perpetrated by Hamas.”
It was the first time in an official statement Gay had referred to the attack that killed hundreds of civilians in Israeli villages and at a music festival as terrorism.
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